This study examines the market-wide impact of entry by a retail pharmacy chain on drug quality and other outcomes in Hyderabad, India. Through a unique data collection and natural experiment methodology, we show that chain entry leads to higher quality and lower prices among incumbents. Relative to a secular decline in quality, drug quality improves by 4.3 percent in entry markets. These results are consistent with quality competition among retail pharmacies. Consumers perceive the quality improvement, suggesting that drug quality is indirectly observable. Based on these findings, policymakers may be able to improve drug quality by encouraging pharmacy chains.
Introduction
Substandard medicine poses a serious public health threat in many developing countries.
Counterfeit and otherwise poor-quality drugs are prevalent in West Africa, Southeast Asia, India, and elsewhere (Bate and Boateng 2007 , Dondorp et al. 2004 , Gaurdiano et al. 2007 ).
Counterfeiters supply many markets with inferior imitations of established name-brand drugs. In India, numerous small manufacturers produce generic medicines in small batches with little regulatory accountability (Corporate Catalyst India 2012) . The public health impact of poor-quality medicine is unknown but potentially severe. Poor-quality drugs cause patients to forgo effective treatments, encourage pathogenic resistance, and expose patients to toxic impurities. In one extreme example, 339 children in Bangladesh died in the fall of 1990 after ingesting paracetamol laced with diethylene glycol (Hanif et al. 1995) .
Markets in developing countries may supply poor-quality medicine for several possible reasons. Regulatory authorities are typically weak and markets operate with few legal restrictions (e.g. Mudur 2003) . When auditing drug quality, India's Drug Control Authority sometimes requires several months to carry out quality tests, by which time many audit samples have expired (Mahesh 2010) . In the absence of regulation, markets may supply lowquality medicine either because poor consumers prefer inexpensive drugs or because scale economies disadvantage high-quality sellers in markets with low demand (Romer 1986 ).
Asymmetric quality information may also foster poor drug quality by causing consumers to purchase inferior drugs unknowingly (Akerlof 1970 , Bagwell 1987 ).
Because of asymmetric information, it is unclear whether market development leads to better medicine. Under observable quality, greater consumer wealth should increase the demand for high-quality medicine and raise quality in the market. If quality is unobservable, firms must somehow communicate quality information to consumers for this process to occur.
In India, recent market expansion has led to the entry of retail pharmacy chains that offer ostensibly high-quality medicine. Chains exploit scale economies by purchasing directly from manufacturers and advertising widely (Basker and Noel 2009, Basker et al. 2012 ).
An evaluation of the impact of chain entry allows us to assess how drug quality evolves with market development. This impact is ambiguous because it depends upon how incumbent pharmacies respond. Chain entry may cause some incumbents to exit, which has an ambiguous effect on quality (Jia 2008) . Competition from the chain may cause remaining incumbents to increase quality (Dranove and Satterthwaite 2000, Bennett et al. 2011), or decrease quality through vertical differentiation. The chain may also affect incumbents indirectly through the wholesale market.
This study evaluates the market-wide impact of entry by a chain pharmacy in Hyderabad, India. MedPlus, which was founded in 2006, operates over 600 retail pharmacies throughout Southern india. The firm offers high-quality medicine and undercuts the prices of incumbents by 5-10 percent. We collaborated with MedPlus to identify candidate entry markets in 2010. The firm actually entered seven of the twenty markets we surveyed. We measure the impact of entry through a multifaceted data collection, including a mystery shopper audit of pharmacies before and after entry. A laboratory assessed the quality of these audit samples. We also surveyed pharmacists and consumers, and measured pharmacy foot traffic.
We implement a difference-in-difference identification strategy. The identifying assumption of this approach is that treatment and control markets have similar unobservable quality trends. As we show below, treatment and control markets have nearly identical baseline levels of price and quality. Of the thirteen control markets in our sample, nine experienced chain entry within two years of the entry decision by MedPlus. We do not find significant trends from baseline to follow-up in socioeconomic status or other market demand characteristics.
MedPlus entry has a large impact on incumbent pharmacies. Although traffic grows by 18 percent among control pharmacies from 2010 to 2011, it falls by 8 percent among treatment pharmacies. Treatment incumbents are 6 percentage points more likely to exit than control incumbents. Among the remaining firms, MedPlus entry is associated with a 2 percent real price decline and a 4 percent improvement in compliance with the Indian Pharmacopeia quality standard. We find particularly strong results for non-national brands, for which pharmacies have greater flexibility over price and quality. We do not find differential effect among high-SES mystery shoppers or among pharmacies that cater to high-SES customers.
These results suggest that MedPlus entry has a market-wide benefit for consumers.
The improvement in quality among treatment pharmacies suggests that consumers can observe quality, either directly or indirectly. We investigate the dissemination of information by examining how MedPlus entry affects consumer quality perceptions. Aggregate results for perceived quality resemble results for actual quality. However we find no correlation between the actual and perceived quality changes of individual pharmacies. These results suggest that consumers are able to infer quality only with substantial noise.
The paper proceeds in Section 2 to provide a theoretical motivation for our analysis.
Section 3 describes the context and data, and Section 4 presents our results. Section 5 concludes.
Theoretical Motivation
This section provides a theoretical motivation for our empirical approach. An industrial organization literature develops multiple theories about the determinants of product quality.
Quality is a product attribute that affects the consumer's utility. Unlike with other product attributes, we may assume that consumer utility increases monotonically with product quality. In the pharmaceutical context, quality refers to the therapeutic effectiveness of the drug in terms of addressing its stated objective. Tirole (1988, Chapter 2) summarizes the alternative ways of modeling quality. Spence (1975) develops a simple and general model of the provision of quality under monopoly. In Spence's model, consumers buy either zero units or one unit, and are placed in descending order according to their willingness to pay. The monopolist, which maximizes profit with respect to both quantity and quality, has two first order conditions. The quantity first order condition pinpoints the identity of the marginal consumer, while this consumer's preference for quality influences the firm's optimal quality choice through the quality first order condition.
Competition ambiguously affects quality be cause leads to a change the firm's optimal quantity, which changes the identity of the marginal consumer. The essential question in Spence's model is whether the marginal utility of quality increases or decreases as we move down the demand curve. This feature is captured by the cross-partial derivative of the inverse demand with respect to quantity and quality. If this derivative is positive, then an increase in market quantity (such as through competition) leads to higher quality. Conversely, if the derivative is negative, then a quantity expansion leads to lower quality. Because this derivative has an ambiguous sign, competition may either increase or decrease quality.
The ability of consumers to observe quality may also influence the effect of competition on quality. Firms have little or no incentive to sell high-quality goods if consumers cannot observe quality (Akerlof 1970) . Nelson (1970) develops this theory further by distinguishing between "experience goods" and "credence goods". Consumers learn about the quality of experience goods after the purchase. A high-quality seller of an experience good may overcome the information asymmetry among first-time buyers by relying on word of mouth and fostering a reputation for high quality. High-quality sellers of experience goods also have a greater incentive to advertise because a greater share of newfound first-time customers make additional purchases (Nelson 1974) .
Incomplete information mutes the impact of competition on quality. If quality is unobservable then the quality elasticity of demand is zero and does not depend on which consumer is marginal. As long as cost increases with quality, all firms supply low quality. If quality is imperfectly observable (e.g. observable with error, or observable only after the sale), then high-quality sellers may rely on signaling, reputation, or word of mouth. Therefore, an examination of the effect of competition on quality tests indirectly whether quality is observable. 
Context
Hyderabad is the fourth largest city in India and the capital of Andhra Pradesh. From 2001 to 2011, the city grew from 3.6 million to 6.8 million through the development of the hightech sector and immigration of poor people from adjacent rural areas (Krank 2007 , GHMC 2012 . Development in Hyderabad is sprawling. The geographic center, near the Hussain Sagar lake has density that is similar to peripheral areas with recent development. These trends have intensified wealth inequality within the city.
The pattern of increasing wealth inequality is apparent in our data. Figure 1 plots the income distribution among non-shopping respondents to our consumer survey (described below) in 2010, 2011, and 2012 . The distribution has become more disperse over time and also shifts to the left. As a repeated cross-section, this survey does not allow us to distinguish between a change in the composition of respondents and changing economic conditions for existing respondents. These consumer trends may affect the price and quality of medicine.
For instance, additional low SES-consumers may increase the demand for inexpensive, lowquality medicine, which is the pattern we observe below.
India's pharmaceutical sector producers 13 percent of global pharmaceutical output (CCI 2012) . The industry consists of around 250 large "national manufacturers" and around 8000 small "local manufacturers." National manufacturers, which supply 70 percent of the domestic market, invest heavily in quality control and brand reputation. India has 74 FDAapproved manufacturing plants, more than any country besides the United States. National manufacturers are generally concerned with compliance with both international and domestic quality standards. Many of these firms advertise heavily in order to establish brand recognition among consumers. By advertising, manufacturers decrease the elasticity of demand for their products, which allows them increase prices. Local manufacturers produce into distinct segments of the quality space (Hotelling 1929) . Consumers who cannot observe quality may demand more of the low-quality good, increasing the incentive to differentiate into the low-quality segment.
small batches of common generic medicines and disseminate them locally. These producers may incentivize local doctors and pharmacies to push their products. As a result, retailers commonly sell dozens of brands of the same popular generic compounds (Kamat and Nichter 1998) .
Retail medicine may have heterogeneous quality for several reasons. According to Woodcock (2004) , a high-quality drug product is free of contamination and reproducibly delivers the therapeutic benefit promised in the label to the consumer. Manufacturers achieve product quality by restricting flexibility in the manufacturing process and by testing end products (Yu 2008) . Acquiring a sufficient quantity of each ingredient is not the primary quality constraint for manufacturers. The care with which distributors and retailers handle drug shipments may also influence drug quality. Drugs degrade and lose effectiveness when they are exposed to heat and humidity. Wholesalers and retailers may mix counterfeits with authentic drugs. Counterfeits imitate the appearance of well-known brands but are not intended to be therapeutically effective. The threat from counterfeits is greater in settings where the supply chain is complicated and opaque. Public health research suggests that drug counterfeiting is an acute concern in West Africa and Southeast Asia (Cockburn et al. 2005 , Dondorp et al. 2004 , Sow et al. 2002 , Taylor et al. 2001 ).
Consumers have a limited ability to observe drug quality. When purchasing medicine, a consumer observes the brand, the condition of the packaging, and the manufacture and expiry dates. The consumer's change in health after taking the drug provides a noisy quality signal.
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Although retailers may also be unaware of the quality of a particular unit sold, ongoing relationships with wholesalers make them relatively informed drug quality. To explore this information asymmetry, Bate et al. (2011) analyze the gradient between price and quality for medicine in 17 poor and middle-income countries. They find a positive gradient, which suggests that quality is at least partially observable. However they also find substantial overlap between the price distributions of compliant and non-compliant samples, so that price is not an informative signal of quality. Figure 2 reproduces this approach using our data. Although the price of compliant samples is higher on average, these distributions heavily overlap, which limits the signaling value of price.
The Drug Control Authority (DCA) is the main pharmaceutical regulator in India. The agency oversees drug manufacturers and audits retail drug quality. The DCA is controversial because it has repeatedly failed to prevent the infiltration of substandard medicine (Kashmir Times 2009). According to a recent report, the DCA took 14 months to test retail drug samples that it obtained through pharmacy audits (Mahesh 2010) . Test results were uninformative because many samples had expired in the interim. Because it has limited resources, the DCA focuses on national manufacturers, while many local manufacturers escape regulatory scrutiny. Despite its shortcomings, DCA oversight appears to limit the flagrant counterfeiting that is reported settings with an even weaker regulatory presence (e.g. Gaurdiano et al. 2007 ).
Small "mom-and-pop" shops are the predominant retail pharmacies in Hyderabad. These firms offer a wide selection of common drugs and almost never require a prescription. Most shops operate small unenclosed storefronts without air conditioning. In our data (described below), pharmacies occupy a median of 350 square feet of retail space. Owners and employees typically lack formal pharmacy training. Retail pharmacy markets are extremely local: pharmacies compete against the other pharmacies that are located within a few blocks. Customers live a median of 0.5 kilometers from pharmacies. The markets we study contain a median of 24 pharmacies per square kilometer.
Our study focuses on two common broad-spectrum antibiotics: ciprofloxacin and amoxicillin. These drugs are used to treat common bacterial infections, including ear infections, urinary tract infections, and upper respiratory infections. Antibiotics have no therapeutic effect on viral infections. In many cases a patient cannot tell whether his illness is viral or bacterial, which confounds the patient's inference about drug quality. Because many peo-ple take these antibiotics, pharmacies are likely to stock multiple brands of each drug. In addition, performing mystery shopper audits on these samples is more natural than for less common drugs, for which a pharmacist might notice the repeat purchases.
Pharmacies sell medicine in (blister pack) "strips" of 8-10 tablets or capsules. Manufacturers heavily influence retail prices by printing a "maximum retail price" (MRP) on each strip. Retailers typically charge the MRP or offer a 5-10 percent discount. Given wholesale prices, retailers cannot profitably discount medicine further. The MRP varies considerably across brands, and a pharmacy can offer a lower price by substituting toward a brand with a lower MRP.
Pharmacies purchase inventory through a complex wholesale market. National manufacturers sell to statewide "carry and forward" (CF) agents, who sell to regional "superstockists", who sell to local wholesale agents. Local manufacturers sell directly to wholesale agents. The multi-layered supply chain makes it difficult to identify the source of substandard medicine. Pharmacies in our sample purchase from a median of eight wholesalers. The Hyderabad does not have a centralized wholesale marketplace. Wholesalers periodically call upon and restock retailers at shop locations.
Chain pharmacies have entered and rapidly expanded through Indian cities in recent years. Chains generally are generally enclosed and air conditioned. They have bettertrained and more knowledgable staff. MedPlus is the largest of three chains that operated in Hyderabad during our study. MedPlus was founded in 2008 and expanded rapidly throughout Hyderabad, Chennai, Bangalore, and elsewhere. By 2010, the chain operated 250 stores in Hyderabad. MedPlus exploits economies of scale to offer lower prices and higher quality than mom-and-pop incumbents. The firm purchases directly from manufacturers in bulk, which allows it to bypass the traditional supply chain. With lower costs, it is able to undercut the prices of incumbents. As a policy, MedPlus offers customers a 10 percent discount off of the MRP.
Data
We rely on an original data set that measures drug quality and other market outcomes for retail pharmacies. In the spring of 2010, MedPlus identified 18 neighborhood markets in Hyderabad where it considered opening new shops. As we describe below, the firm actually entered seven markets. Figure 3 shows the locations of these markets within Hyderabad.
Treatment markets have dark, dotted labels and control markets have light, plain labels.
The map illustrates that sample markets are a very small subset of the pharmacy markets within the city. We collected baseline ("Round 1") data in all 18 markets (plus two others with lower socioeconomic status) before entry by MedPlus. We repeated survey one year later ("Round 2") and in a more limited fashion two years later ("Round 3").
The data collection involved several components. We first conducted a census of pharmacies within 1 kilometer of each market center. We enrolled the three pharmacies closest to the center and randomly selected two others, for a total of five pharmacies per market and 100 pharmacies overall. In Rounds 2 and 3, we also enrolled newly opened MedPlus pharmacies in treatment markets. For each sample pharmacy, we implemented a mystery shopper audit, a pharmacy survey, and a customer traffic enumeration. We also surveyed pharmacy customers and other adults in each market. Round 3 did not include the mystery shopper audit or the pharmacy survey. Therefore, results for drug quality and price are based on data from Rounds 1 and 2.
We audited each pharmacy four times per survey. The audit included mystery shoppers with both high and low socioeconomic status (SES). High and low-SES mystery shoppers dressed, spoke, and carried themselves distinctively.
3 Within each SES scenario, we conducted audits in which we purchased either ciprofloxacin or amoxicillin. Mystery shoppers were careful to engage in realistic interactions with pharmacists. Shoppers requested the the compound but explicitly allowed the pharmacist to choose the brand of medicine. 4 Shoppers reported that pharmacists were "not suspicious" of the interaction 94 percent of the time.
A laboratory in Delhi evaluated the quality of the drug samples. We tested whether samples complied with the Indian Pharmacopeia (IP) drug quality standard. IP is the official quality benchmark in India and consists of three criteria for the drugs we tested:
active ingredient concentration, uniformity, and dissolution. To comply with IP, a sample must contain 90-100 percent of the correct active ingredient concentration. Uniformity must fall below 5 for amoxicillin and below 7.5 for ciprofloxacin, and the minimum dissolution must be greater than 80. A sample that falls short of any of these requirements is considered substandard. IP compliance is our primary quality outcome below.
The samples we obtained through these audits were generally high quality. The analysis below distinguishes between drugs from national and local manufacturers. A research assistant collaborated with laboratory officials to categorize each sample manufacturer as national, local, or other. This categorization is based on information from manufacturer websites and direct knowledge of large Indian firms. In the analysis below, we combine the "local" and "other" categories in order to distinguish between national and non-national brands. 5 Since pharmacists select the brand of medicine to sell to auditors, the brand type is endogenous in our data. However a regression of brand type on MedPlus entry similar to equation (1) shows a precisely estimated zero effect of treatment on brand type
In conjunction with the audit, we surveyed consumers regarding their demographic characteristics, drug purchases, drug quality perceptions, and health. For half of the consumer sample, we enrolled customers who had just purchased medicine from sample pharmacies (N = 2602). We drew the rest of the sample from among adults present in the market area (N = 2632). This approach allows us to compare pharmacy shoppers to the general population. Since these groups appear similar in practice, we do not distinguish between shoppers and non-shoppers in the analysis below. 6 We also measured the customer traffic at each sample pharmacy. From 6-7PM and 7:30-8:30PM on randomly chosen days, enumerators counted the number of customers who entered each pharmacy. We selected these windows based on pilot data showing that traffic peaked in the evening.
MedPlus Entry
This subsection discusses MedPlus's entry process and its implications for our empirical ap- The firm actually opened stores in seven of the markets it identified. Between Rounds 2 and 3, other chains entered nine of the remaining eleven markets. The ability to obtain suitable retail space was a key entry determinant for MedPlus. As we show below, this consideration appears to be correlated with the baseline density of pharmacies in the area.
Our analysis includes two additional markets that MedPlus did not intend to enter, which are poorer than average. Results do not depend on whether these markets are included or excluded.
A comparison of MedPlus and incumbent pharmacies shows that MedPlus undercuts incumbents on price while offering higher quality medicine. Table 1 All MedPlus shops are air conditioned, compared to only 12 percent of control incumbents.
Customers of MedPlus and incumbents have similar characteristics, although MedPlus customers are slightly wealthier and more price-and quality-sensitive.
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The identifying assumption of the difference-in-difference strategy is that outcome variables have similar unobservable trends in treatment and control markets. 8 For results to arise spuriously, prices must fall and quality must rise in treatment markets for reasons other than MedPlus entry. Table 2 In Table 2 As an indirect test of the identifying assumption, we compare changes over time in demographic characteristics of non-shopping consumers. By affecting demand, demographic changes may influence the price and quality of medicine irrespective of MedPlus entry. Table   3 the one year difference in household income, education, household size, caste, and vehicle ownership (Columns 1-2), as well as the difference in difference for these variables (Column 3). Only household income has a statistically significant differential trend. The negative differential income trend in treatment markets is not likely to generate a spurious improvement in drug quality if drug quality is a normal good.
Estimation

The Impact of Chain Entry
We use a difference-in-difference approach to estimate the impact of entry by MedPlus on drug quality, prices, and other outcomes. This approach compares changes over time in markets that MedPlus does and does not enter. Regressions employ the following specification:
In this equation, s indexes the audit scenario, i indexes the pharmacy, m indexes the market, and t indexes the time period. P ost t is an indicator for Round 2 and T reat m is an indicator for MedPlus entry markets. Market fixed effects, α m , control for baseline differences between treatment and control markets, as well as other time-constant market attributes.
Some regressions include market demographic and health controls, Ω mt , which are all of the variables in Table 3 . Compliance with Indian Pharmacopeia (IP) is our primary quality outcome. Other outcomes include price, customer traffic, market exit, and consumer-perceived quality. All standard errors are clustered by market.
The difference-in-difference estimator compares the changes in the outcome in treatment and control groups. Figures 7 and 8 illustrate the identifying variation for the quality and price estimates by plotting the changes in quality and price. The figures distinguish between national and non-national brands. We find no significant differential quality and price trends for national brands. In Figure 7 , quality improves in treatment markets and deteriorates in control markets for non-national brands. In Figure 8 , prices (which are adjusted for inflation) fall in both treatment and control markets, but fall differentially in treatment markets.
Entry by MedPlus has a large impact on incumbent pharmacies. Figure 9 shows the development of customer traffic and market exit among incumbents. On the left, customer traffic grew by 25 percent from 2010 to 2012 in control markets but stagnated in treatment markets. To examine market exit, we limit the full pharmacy census to firms that are present in Round 1 (n = 351). 9 percent of treatment incumbents exit within two years, compared to 4 percent of control incumbents. 9 Appendix Table 4 shows these results in regression form. Both effects are statistically significant.
We estimate the impact of chain entry on incumbent drug quality in Table 4 . Columns 1 and 2 show the effect for the full sample, excluding and including market demographic and health controls. In Column 1, compliance with IP remains constant in treatment markets while declining by 4.3 percentage points in control markets. In Column 2, chain entry 9 We cannot examine the impact of chain entry on the entry of other firms because we do not observe firms that are at risk of entry but do not actually enter.
is associated with 6.6 percent greater compliance once we include demographic and health controls. Columns 3-7 distinguish between drugs from national and non-national manufacturers. Columns 3 and 4 show no impact of chain entry on the quality of drugs from national manufacturers. In contrast, Columns 5-7 show a large and significant impact of chain entry on the quality of drugs from non-national manufacturers. Relative to control markets, IP compliance increases by 20-24 percentage points in treatment markets. These results suggest that incumbent pharmacies have more latitude to adjust the quality of non-national brands.
Pharmacies may have improved quality either by offering better brands or offering better versions of the same brands. We explore these mechanisms by including manufacturer fixed effects in Column 7. This step attenuates the treatment effect estimate by 37 percent compared to the estimate in Column 6. These results suggest that 63 percent of the effect in Column 6 arises through substitution across non-national brands.
For a more complete understanding of how chain entry affects quality, we estimate the effect separately for the components of IP compliance. For each of active ingredient concentration, uniformity, and dissolution, we construct a variable that equals 1 if quality exceeds a threshold, X. We estimate equation (1) for these outcomes while varying X across the range of possible quality values. Figures 10. 11 and 12 plot the impact of chain entry for each quality outcome. In Figure 10 , quality improves for samples with 90-97 percent of the correct dosage, as well as for samples with over 104 percent of the correct dosage. In Figure   11 , there is no significant effect on uniformity. In Figure 12 , there is a small but significant effect on dissolution in the range of 80-90 and a larger but insignificant effect around 95. As we describe above, the active ingredient concentration must fall between 90-110 percent of the correct dosage and dissolution must be greater than 80 in order for the sample to comply with IP. These figures show that the impact of chain entry is not localized around official compliance thresholds, which suggests that these thresholds are not important determinants of quality in this setting.
We estimate the impact of chain entry on incumbent prices in Table 5 . Columns 1 and 2 show a negative but statistically insignificant impact on prices in the full sample. In Columns 3 and 4, the treatment effect for national brand drugs is also insignificant. However, Columns 5-8 show a negative and significant effect on the prices of non-national brand drugs. MedPlus entry is associated with a 10-13 percent decline in the price of non-national brand drugs.
As above, we investigate the contributions of intra-brand and inter-brand substitution by including manufacturer fixed effects in Column 7. Including fixed effects slightly increases the coefficient estimate, which suggest that the impact on price occurs through discounts rather than substitution toward brands with lower MRPs. Finally, Column 8 shows a negative and significant impact on price after controlling for IP compliance. This result reinforces that chain entry is associated with thinner profit margins for incumbent pharmacies, which is consistent with the competition mechanism.
Next we investigate the robustness of the price and quality estimates. The identifying assumption of our approach is that chain entry is uncorrelated with unobservable quality and price trends. If unobservable trends are correlated with baseline market characteristics, then controlling for the interaction of these characteristics with P ost t should attenuate the treatment effect. An additional concern is that results are driven by regression toward the mean. We address this concern by controlling for the interaction between the baseline value of the dependent variable (averaged by pharmacy) and P ost t .
Estimates of these robustness tests for non-national brand drugs appear in Table 6 .
Quality regressions appear in Columns 1-4 and price regressions appear in Columns 5-8.
Columns 1,2, 5, and 6 interact P ost t with Round 1 values of the demographic and health controls from Table 3 . Columns 3 and 7 control for the interaction with Round 1 pharmacy characteristics, including the firm's customer traffic, age, number of signs (i.e. its street visibility), and the percent of its space allocated to medicine. Columns 4 and 8 interact P ost t with the pharmacy's average IP compliance in Round 1. Under these specifications, the estimated impact on quality ranges from 0.13 to 0.19 (compared to 0.20 in Column 6 of Table 4 ) and is statistically significant. The estimated impact on price ranges from -0.18 to -0.07 (compared to -0.11 in Column 6 of Table 5 ), and is significant in regressions except Column 7. These findings mitigate the concern that the impact of chain entry could be spurious.
The preceding analysis focuses on the effect of chain entry for incumbent pharmacies.
An assessment of the impact on consumer welfare should account for consumers who now shop at the chain. As we describe above, seven MedPlus pharmacies open between Round 1 and Round 2. To measure the market-wide impact of chain entry, we include MedPlus pharmacies in the analysis and reweight the regressions according to each firm's customer traffic. Estimates for the market-wide effect on quality and prices appear in Table 7 . In Columns 1 and 2, MedPlus entry is associated with a 5-7 percentage point increase in IP compliance. In Columns 5 and 6, MedPlus entry is associated with a 5-6 percent decline in prices. The quality impact is comparable to the baseline result in Table 4 , while the price impact is roughly double the baseline result in Table 5 .
Heterogeneity in the treatment effect may also affect the welfare assessment of chain entry. Chain entry may affect shops that cater to high-SES and low-SES customers differently, or may cause pharmacists to respond differently to their high-SES and low-SES customers. In the remainder of Table 7 , we explore these possible sources of heterogeneity. Columns 3 and 7 incorporate a triple interaction with the average education of each pharmacy's shoppers.
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These regressions show a small and insignificant interaction, which suggests that chain entry does not differentially affect shops that cater to high-SES or low-SES customers. Columns 4 and 8 incorporate a triple interaction with the SES of the auditor. These regressions measure whether pharmacies discriminate among high-SES and low-SES customers in terms of the quality or price of medicine. Again, we find small and insignificant effects, which suggest that firms do not systematically discriminate. Taken together, these estimates indicate that chain entry is broadly beneficial to consumers.
Quality and Information
In this subsection we explore the relationship between actual quality and quality perceived by consumers. Despite the concern about asymmetric information, we find that chain entry leads to higher quality among incumbents. This result suggests that consumers can perceive quality, at least to a limited degree. If quality were completely unobservable, incumbents would not respond to MedPlus entry by raising quality because doing so would not elicit an increase in firm demand. We proceed to examine the effect of chain entry on perceived drug quality. The consumer survey elicits perceived drug quality on a four-point Likert scale. We ask about quality at "nearby pharmacies", and among "national brand" and "local brand" drugs.
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In this analysis, we distinguish between customers of sample pharmacies ("shoppers") and people we found passing through the market centers ("non-shoppers"). Shoppers, who have chosen to buy medicine, may perceive higher quality than others who have chosen to avoid pharmacies. In contrast, non-shoppers are more likely to be representative of the pool of potential pharmacy customers. Although we show results for both groups below, the estimates for non-shoppers have a more transparent interpretation.
Estimates of the effect of chain entry on perceived quality appear in Table 8 . Since consumer data are available for all three rounds, we estimate separate treatment effects for Round 2 and Round 3. Odd columns exclude market demographic and health controls while even columns include these variables. Columns 1 and 2 show that there is a positive and significant effect of chain entry on the perceived quality of nearby pharmacies. This effect is similar for shoppers and non-shoppers, and is most pronounced in Round 3. The estimate of 0.18 for non-shoppers in Column 2 represents 36 percent of a standard deviation in this variable. In Columns 3 and 4, we find a weaker and generally insignificant relationship between chain entry and the quality of national brand drugs. This result is consistent with 11 The questionnaire permits a response of "don't know". 10 percent of respondents do not know the quality of medicine at nearby pharmacies. 31 percent do not know the quality of national brand drugs and 39 percent do not know the quality of local brand drugs.
the finding in Table 4 that actual quality does not improve among national brands. In contrast, we find large and significant effects of chain entry on the perceived quality of local brand drugs. The estimate of 0.62 for non-shoppers in Column 3 represents 70 percent of a standard deviation in this variable. These results provide additional evidence that consumers at least partially observe drug quality.
To examine further the dissemination of quality information in the market, we consider the correlation between market-wide actual and perceived quality. Figure 13 Table 8 that consumers at least imperfectly observe quality.
A limitation on the information dissemination to consumers is evident from the relationship between changes in actual and perceived quality. Figure 14 plots one-year changes in IP compliance and perceived quality by market. There is no correlation between these changes, which suggests that consumers require more than one year to perceive market-wide quality information. In combination, the results in Figure 14 and Table 8 seem paradoxical.
Consumers perceive a quality improvement associated with MedPlus entry, but do not accurately perceive the quality improvements in individual markets. A possible resolution of this puzzle is that consumer perceptions may be based in part on anticipation of the competitive effects of chain entry. The presence of the chain may provide a credible signal about the quality of medicine within the entire market.
Discussion and Conclusion
The results above show that chain entry is associated with an improvement in quality and a decline in price among incumbent mom-and-pop competitors. Some of this result is due to quality declining in control markets, which is consistent with the inflow of immigrants to these communities who are poorer and demand less expensive medicine. We find a differential response for non-national brands, for which retail pharmacies have greater discretion over pricing and the selection of brands of particular quality.
Although we have motivated these results in terms of quality competition to MedPlus entry, several other mechanisms may in principle explain our findings. First, it is possible that the presence of MedPlus causes a change in consumer perceptions regarding drug quality. For instance, the firm could make people aware that high quality medicine is available, whereas they were not aware before. Our results are not consistent with this story because we see a price decline. If the quality response were due solely to a demand shock, we would expect the prices to rise as the equilibrium moved along the demand curve. Secondly, irrespective of actual consumer perceptions, MedPlus entry may change incumbents perceptions of consumer perceptions. However it is unclear how this shift would lead to lower prices, particularly in the market segment where MedPlus chose to enter.
An alternative possibility is that MedPlus has affected incumbent quality indirectly through the wholesale market. The firm operates outside of the market, purchasing directly from manufacturers or in some cases manufacturing its own branded medicine. In addition, the wholesale market in Hyderabad is diffuse -there is not a centralized location where retailers purchase medicine. Instead wholesalers circulate and resupply retailers periodically.
Therefore there is no spatial correlation between MedPlus entry and the wholesale market.
If wholesalers have economies of scale (scope?) in particular brands, the arrival of MedPlus may cause them to drop the brands due to a reduction in demand. Anecdotal evidence based on our interaction with wholesalers suggests that the cost of carrying a particular brand is proportional to sales (e.g. transportation costs, placing orders), and so it is unlikely that this mechanism would be important. Finally, it is possible that MedPlus entry may cause retailers to unload low-quality medicine in control markets, driving down quality there, rather than necessarily raising quality treatment markets. This pattern is unlikely to be important based on the geography of the sample. Any such dumping would occur throughout the city and would not be targeted at the particular control markets that we happen to sample (see Figure 3 ).
Our study has several important implications. First, it indicates that consumers can infer drug quality to some degree. Without that aspect, it is difficult to understand why quality would improve. This finding circumscribes the deleterious welfare and health impact of substandard medicine. If people can effectively figure out whether drugs are good or bad, they are less susceptible to consuming low-quality medicine when idiosyncratic circumstances (e.g. extreme illnesses) call for them to take drugs that are more quality-assured.
This study suggests that encouragement and subsidies for chains are a promising way to improve drug quality in weak regulatory settings. Chains capture economies of scale that enable them to sell high quality drugs cheaper. And it does not appear to be a serious concern that quality will get worse at incumbent pharmacies as a response. Subsidies for chains are likely to be easier to implement in practice than the establishment of a strong regulator who could enforce quality standards directly.
Finally the results speak to the impact of market development on pharmaceutical quality.
The entry of chains is emblematic of the growth of markets in India. The expansion of markets appears to lead to better quality medicine. We do not find important heterogeneous effects by socioeconomic status, which would otherwise raise concerns about this process. As countries develop and markets become larger, we may expect that drug quality will generally improve.
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